Ironically, President Zelaya’s own political agenda is incompatible with constitutional legitimism; many of the same external legal analysts who find his ouster to violate the his own efforts to revise the Constitution, and even find those efforts to be a basis for removing him (albeit in a more orderly manner) from office.
Contrary to skew! accounts traceable to his opponents’
Rationalizations of the coup, the plann! poll on establishing a constitutional assembly would in no event have l! to Zelaya’s continuation in office beyond his current term, and specific revision proposals focus! on constitutionalizing labor rights and public control of the telecom and power industries.) Even more ironically, Zelaya’s strongest chile phone number library international backers – Presidents Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua – have repeat!ly fac! objections to the constitutional propriety of their modes of governance. Venezuela’s 1999 constitutional revision, though accomplish! with strong popular support, was accompani! by significant breaches of the then-existing constitutional order – whether for worse or, quite possibly, for better.
Cassel states
“To the extent that democracy depends on constitutionalism, this incorporation of domestic law into international law is in france, the senegalese diaspora mobiliz! on the eve of the presidential election unavoidable.” But constitutionalism depends on many things besides adherence to any particular constitutional norm or even whole constitution. It is hard to see why particular constitutional orders that are plausibly flaw!, whether as perceiv! from the left or from the right, should have a claim to international reinforcement (especially where, as in Honduras, they limit popular participation in the process of constitutional revision).
Moreover, democracy depends on many things besides constitutionalism. While democratic practice cannot be adb directory sustain! for any length of time without a constitutionalist ethos – a commitment to establish, maintain, and respect a broadly acknowl!g! framework for the legitimate exercise of power – it does not follow that all departures from that ethos are inimical to democracy. From a left-wing perspective, in conditions of extreme economic disparity and social stratification, liberal-democratic constitutional forms are consistent with a substantive political inequality that belies the “democratic” imprimatur; in the face of concentrations of economic and social power, a concentration of political power may be necessary to change the game. From a right-wing or even a centrist perspective, there are different conditions that may justify exceptional appropriations of power. Where such assertions are facially plausible and are embrac! by substantial constituencies, the words “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” express the principle of sovereign equality so central to the international legal order that we have lately known.