As not by Horowitz, States frequently express the concern that the regulation of arm group activity may challenge their sovereignty, and imply, inter alia, the illegitimacy of the State, the erosion of State authority, or the legitimacy of the arm group (and its use of force). These concerns are longstanding. They were a feature of the discussions that l to the codification of common Article 3 and they remain a key issue today, even within the IHL context, and despite the fact that the application of IHL to arm groups is universally accept. States’ concerns are not baseless: the emergence of an arm group unquestionably denotes a limitation of State authority.
However State authority is limit
by the application of legal obligations to arm groups: it is limit by the existence of the arm group and by the State’s inability to impose its authority. It is precisely this displacement of State authority that necessitates the dentist data international regulation of arm groups, but that international regulation will only persist for as long as State authority is displac. In this sense, international regulation is a consequence, not cause, of any limitation to sovereignty. It is worth highlighting that when addressing the international regulation of the TRNC de facto authority in northern Cyprus, the European Court of Human Rights stat that the international regulation of the TRNC does not legitimate the TRNC or affect Cyprus’ continuing sovereignty (para. 84).
Concerns vis-à-vis State sovereignty
Likely to continue. However, the reality of arm group control must also how often should you resign your website? be acknowlg. The attribution of human rights obligations to arm groups is necessary, but measures should be The mobile lead regulation of arm taken to ensure that these obligations directly correspond to, and are limit by, the displacement of State authority, thereby corresponding exclusively to the reality at hand.